Omniscience and ignorance

Duncan  Pritchard

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41050

Autores

Duncan Pritchard University of California Irvine (UCI), Irvine, CA, USA. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5997-0752

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41050

Palavras-chave:

Epistemologia, Deus, Ignorância, Onisciência, Filosofia da Religião

Resumo

A onisciência de Deus gera certos enigmas, e não menos a respeito de como tal onisciência é compatível com o livre arbítrio humano. Uma opção a este respeito é impor limitações ao escopo do conhecimento de Deus, mas isso levanta a questão adicional de como tais limitações podem ser compatíveis com a natureza de Deus como um ser perfeito. Eu ofereço uma nova maneira de abordar essas questões, que apela para o que eu afirmo ser uma distinção motivada de forma independente entre falta de conhecimento e ser ignorante. Em particular, afirma-se que a onisciência de Deus é melhor entendida não como um conhecimento completo de todas as verdades, mas sim como um tipo de não conhecimento deliberado (de modo que o não conhecimento não indica qualquer carência cognitiva da parte de Deus) que exclui ignorância. Deus pode não saber todas as verdades, mas isso não é devido a qualquer carência cognitiva, e certamente não há nenhuma verdade sobre a qual ele seja ignorante.

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Biografia do Autor

Duncan Pritchard, University of California Irvine (UCI), Irvine, CA, USA.

PhD in Philosophy from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, UK; Professor of Philosophy at the University of Irvine (UCI), CA, USA.

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