Crenças “gettierizadas” e conhecimento procedimental
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24267Palavras-chave:
conhecimento procedimental, conhecimento proposicional, crença, “gettierização”.Resumo
Defendo que a gettierização de crenças práticas candidatas a conhecimento procedimental e a gettierização de crenças proposicionais candidatas a conhecimento proposicional produzem diferentes consequências. Contra o intelectualismo genérico, argumento que essa diferença implica que o conhecimento procedimental não é conhecimento proposicional, nem a esse pode ser reduzido.
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