Gettierized Beliefs and Knowledge-How
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24267Keywords:
Knowledge-How, Propositional Knowledge, Belief, Gettierization.Abstract
I hold that gettierization of practical beliefs, candidates to know-how, and gettierization of propositional beliefs, candidates to propositional knowledge, create distinctive outcomes. Against generic intellectualism, I argue that this distinctiveness implies that knowhow is not propositional knowledge, and that the former can not be reduced to the latter.
Downloads
References
BAUMANN, P. Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action. In: Logos & Episteme, 3 (2012), p. 7-26. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20123147
BENGSON, J.; MOFFETT, M.; WRIGHT, J. The Folk on Knowing How. In: Philosophical Studies, 142 (2009), p. 24-50. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x
CARTER, J. A.; PRITCHARD, D. H. Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. In: Noûs, 49:3 (2015), p. 440-453. (Online First, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12054). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12054
CATH, Y. Knowing How Without Knowing That. In: BENGSON, J.; MOFFETT, M. (eds.). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 113-135. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.003.0005
ESTEVINHA RODRIGUES, Luis. Conhecimento procedimental e gettierização. In: Princípios, 21:36 (2014), p. 9-26.
GETTIER, E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. In: Analysis, 23 (1963), p. 121-123. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121
HAWTHORNE, J. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269556.001.0001
NOË, A. Against Intellectualism. In: Analysis, 65:288 (2005), p. 278-290. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.4.278
POSTON, T. Know-How to be Gettiered?. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79 (2009), p. 743-747. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00301.x
ROCCO, P.; PARRY, G. The Epistemology of Quality Improvement: It’s All Greek. In: BMJ Quality and Safety, Suppl. 1 (2011), p. 24-27. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjqs.2010.046557
RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949.
SCHIFFER, S. Amazing Knowledge. In: The Journal of Philosophy, 99:4 (2002), p. 200-202. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3655616
STANLEY, J. Know How. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001
_____. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
STANLEY, J.; WILLIAMSON, T. Knowing How. In: Journal of Philosophy, 98 (2001), p. 411-444. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2678403
WEATHERSON, B. What Good Are Counterexamples?. In: Philosophical Studies, 115 (2003), p. 1-31. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024961917413
WILLIAMSON, T. Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge. In: Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (2005), p. 213-235. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00396.x
