The myth of knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2016.3.22018Keywords:
Knowledge. Fallibilism. Cartesianism.Abstract
In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence Bonjour defends the thesis that the “fallibilist” conception of knowledge, assumed by most epistemologists in the post-Gettier era, “is wrong” – such a “weak” concept of knowledge provides little philosophical satisfaction, and is non-existent in common sense, thus constituting only a “philosophical myth”.
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References
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