Reflective Equilibrium, Moral Intuitions and the Quest for Coherence
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2018.3.30820Keywords:
Reflective Equilibrium, Moral Intuitions, Coherentist Model, Intuitionist Model.Abstract
How should we investigate to decide what to believe about moral matters? How should the plausibility of judgments, theories and moral principles be assessed? How should we remove our doubts when we are not sure what is right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust? The method of reflective equilibrium, developed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and since then adopted by an increasingly large number of philosophers, is an attempt to answer such questions. The reflective equilibrium can be (and, in fact, it was) interpreted in a variety of ways, some of them completely at odds with each other, but the two more representative views are the coeherentist and the intuitionist models. In this paper my aim is to argue that we should understand the reflective equilibrium as an intuitionist model for the moral inquiry. So, I compare these two views, how they differ in the way they characterize the workings and goals of this method, to make the following claim: the coeherentist model makes the moral investigation a mere search for coherence, thus not acknowledging the methodological (and epistemological) role that moral intuitions do have in our moral reflections. In contrast, the intuitionist view offers a model that integrates moral intuition with the search for coherence, explaining why and how these two elements can and should work together in our moral inquiries. It is my contention that only when interpreted as a intuitionist model the reflective equilibrium can be seen as the method used in the moral inquires of competent moral philosophers, such as John Rawls, Judith Jarvis Thomson and Peter Singer.Downloads
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