For a feminist theory of justice

Nussbaum’s and Okin’s critique of Rawls

Abstract

This article aims to present and develop the feminist critiques of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, especially through the dialogue and contributions of Martha Nussbaum and Susan Okin to the establishment of a feminist liberalism. In order to do so, we discuss three central points in the debate between these two feminist philosophers and Rawls: a) the notion of the family as an institution of the basic structure of society; b) the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive moral doctrines; and c) the conception of political person with full autonomy. Critiques of Rawlsian theory by feminist authors demonstrate Rawls’s importance for contemporary liberalism, while at the same time pointing to the problems that theories that traditionally do not develop a critical eye for the gendered situation of democratic systems find in addressing the situation of women’s citizenship. The demands of liberal feminism, related to the situation of women around the world, are well articulated by Nussbaum from her internal critique of Rawlsian liberalism, emphasizing that some of the Rawls’ theoretical dispositions (especially in relation to the issue of how Rawls’ regards the institution of the family) do not appear to be radical enough to ensure the full availability of these capabilities for women and children. Similarly, Nussbaum’s dialogue with Okin’s critiques deepened the debate over the limits of Rawls’s theory of justice.