Does anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony imply interest relativism about knowledge attributions?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41472Keywords:
Contextualism, Invariantism, Reductionism, Relativism, Anti-reductionism, TestimonyAbstract
Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the thesis that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge. Interest relativism about knowledge attributions is the thesis that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical contexts. This paper argues that anti-reductionism implies interest relativism. The notion of “implies” here is a fairly strong one: anti-reductionism, together with plausible assumptions, entails interest relativism. A second thesis of the paper is that anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony creates significant pressure toward attributor contextualism (a version of interest relativism). Even if anti-reductionism does not strictly entail attributor contextualism, the most powerful motivations for anti-reductionism also motivate attributor contextualism over alternative positions.
Downloads
References
COADY, C. A. J. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
COHEN, Stewart. Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, [S. I.], v. 76, p. 289- 306, 1997. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409812348411
COHEN, Stewart. Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards. Synthese, [S. I. ], n. 73, p. 3-26, 1987: DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485440
DEROSE, Keith. The Case for Contextualism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001
DEROSE, Keith. Solving the Skeptical Problem. The Philosophical Review, [S. I.], n. 104, p. 1-52, 1995. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2186011
FANTL, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001
FAULKNER, Paul. Knowledge on Trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.001.0001
GRECO, John. The Transmission of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
GRECO, John. Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, [S. I.], v. 49, n. 1, p. 15-28, 2012.
GRIMM, Stephen. Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides. In: David Henderson and John Greco (ed.). Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.003.0005
HAWTHORNE, John. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269556.001.0001
HINCHMAN, Edward. Telling as Inviting to Trust. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, [S. I.], v. 70, n. 3, p. 562-587, 2005. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00415.x
LEWIS, David K. Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, [S. I.], v. 74, n. 4, p. 549-56, 1996. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347521
MACFARLANE, Jonathan. The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. In: GENDLER, Tamar; HAWTHORNE, John (ed.). Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. v. 1, p. 197-233.
MCMYLER, Benjamin. Testimony, Trust, and Authority. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794331.001.0001
GRAHAM, Peter. Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms. In: HENDERSON, David; GRECO, John (ed.). Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. p. 247-273. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.003.0011
MORAN, Richard. The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190873325.001.0001
MORAN, Richard. Getting Told and Being Believed. In: LACKEY, Jennifer; SOSA, Ernest (ed.). The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0013
STANLEY, Jason. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
WRIGHT, Stephan. In Defence of Transmission. Episteme, [S. I.], v. 12, n. 113-128, 2015. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.33
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 Veritas (Porto Alegre)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
