Riesgo epistémico
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https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.46598Palabras clave:
Risco Epistêmico, Sorte Epistêmica, Conhecimento, EpistemologiaResumen
Este texto es una traducción del artículo de Duncan Pritchard titulado Epistemic Risk (2016), en el que argumenta a favor de una teoría modal del riesgo y sienta las bases de una epistemología anti-riesgo. El objetivo de Pritchard en este artículo es doble: en primer lugar, argumenta que su teoría modal del riesgo es una extensión natural de su teoría modal de la suerte, desarrollada en trabajos anteriores. En segundo lugar, al utilizar su teoría modal del riesgo para acceder a una epistemología anti-riesgo, Pritchard argumenta que esta estrategia tiene ventajas para responder a las preocupaciones suscitadas por su teoría anti-suerte original. A saber, una laguna en su epistemología anti-suerte puede llenarse fácilmente con su epistemología anti-riesgo, y hay más motivaciones para adoptar la segunda que la primera.
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