A integridade jurídica como virtude moral
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2025.1.47222Palavras-chave:
Integridade, Ética das Virtudes, Interpretação do DireitoResumo
Defendo que a melhor leitura da integridade do direito é considerá-la como uma virtude moral, no sentido mais robusto do conceito. Tomo por base as reflexões sobre a integridade de Ronald Dworkin, sobretudo em Law’s Empire (“O Império do Direito”, 1986), cuja abordagem é das mais prestigiadas na filosofia jurídica contemporânea. A partir disso, esclareço como o valor moral da integridade jurídica encontra forte correlação com a reflexão neoaristotélica sobre virtudes. Por fim, discuto as consequências e vantagens teóricas e práticas alcançadas por essa compreensão de integridade.
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