“Augustinian compatibilism”

on the relationship between theological determinism and moral responsibility

Abstract

In recent decades, the analysis of the relationship between moral responsibility and determinism has advanced in research on Augustine. It is a question of answering, then, how human action can be endowed with moral responsibility given the existence of God, in the properties consecrated by the Bishop of Hippo and which have become, to a large extent, the properties of divinity in the classic definition of Christian theism. Scholars coined the concept of “Augustinian compatibilism”, trying to define the position of Augustine’s mature philosophy, which simultaneously defends the maintenance of human moral responsibility and the absoluteness of divine power, capable of determining human actions. Having this concept as its object, our objective comprises an initial analysis of its philosophical viability, that is, an analysis of its content as a proposed solution to the problem in question and the apparent insufficiency of the concept, whether designating something in Augustinian philosophy or for compatibilist theories. We begin with a section on the contemporary treatment of the relationship between theological determinism and moral responsibility, and move on to introducing the concept of “Augustinian compatibilism” into the topic; we then deal with the key points of Augustine’s philosophy, especially his theory on moral action, to demonstrate the metaphysical distinctions between good and bad action. Finally, we reserve the last section to demonstrate how the two pillars of compatibilism, determinism and free will, although present in Augustine’s philosophy, cannot be applied without considering the metaphysical genesis from which the Bishop of Hippo departs, a genesis that does not seem to be covered by the concept of “Augustinian compatibilism”.